INTRODUCTION
There are a number of ways to approach the published works of Gadamer and Habermas. One can, for example, attempt a careful exegesis of a particular text. This Article, however, will be of a much more opportunistic character. We will herein scavenge the work of Gadamer and Habermas in hopes of making progress on a problem that, admittedly, neither writer has specifically addressed.
In particular, we will seek to make progress on understanding the hate speech problem, at its most legally fundamental levels.
We must justify the choice of the hate speech problem as our focus, as well as the choice of Gadamer and Habermas as sources of potential inspiration. Of course, our chosen approach must be judged ultimately by its fruitfulness, or lack thereof. But a few elements of a preliminary justification can be offered at the outset. Over the past two decades or so, a great deal of passion and intellectual energy has been devoted to one aspect or another of the possibility of regulating * Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; currently Visiting Professor of Law at Michigan State University-DCL, East Lansing. For the author's previous foray into hate speech law, see chapter 3 in R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW 57-93 (1990) . The author wishes to thank Professor Jay Mootz.
1. We refer herein to "the hate speech problem" solely for convenience. There is admittedly no consensually recognized, monolithic hate speech problem. In fact, the hate speech problem is multiple, taking on different dimensions in diverse legal and social contexts. We will attempt to make such progress as we can without claiming to address all such contexts. For a sense of some of the commonalities and complexities, see generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) ; THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) . Much of our focus will be narrowly on the use of racial epithets in one context or another, but the use of racial epithets hardly exhausts the scope of racist speech in a broader sense. For a useful narrow definition, tying hate speech to insulting epithets, see Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 71 (1996) . Generally, such a narrow definition will suffice for our purposes herein. hate speech. 2 The hate speech problem is, at least for the typical victims of hate speech, of practical importance. 3 But of late, progress in understanding and theoretically resolving the hate speech problem has stalled. The commentators have arrayed themselves along a broad continuum of responses, in an apparently stable, unproductive fashion. 4 Under these circumstances, any indirect assistance with the hate speech problem from whatever source is to be welcomed.
The choice of Gadamer and Habermas as sources of potential inspiration makes some preliminary, general sense. Each has, after all, done his share of careful reflection, over a period of time, on the use of language, and on language in the law. 5 There seems no tenet or principle within their work that delegitimizes our enterprise from the start. Habermas in particular has developed the Austinian distinction 2. Consider, for example, the grass roots efforts upon which judicial judgment was eventually passed in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) ; Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989 ) (addressing, respectively, two city ordinances and three public university antidiscrimination codes).
3. Consider, as an example deliberately chosen for its atypicality, the personal experience recounted by the philosopher Wojciech Sadurski as a recent Polish immigrant to Australia. Sadurski reports that he attended, out of civic devotion, a local town council meeting at which one speaker made anti-immigrant, and, in particular, anti-Polish remarks, raising questions of child safety and town cleanliness standards. Sadurski then reports that [Slince the day I have heard the speech, my life has clearly been transformed for the worse. Whenever I meet my neighbours, fellow workers, or salespersons in the shops, I search for expressions of dislike or contempt in their eyes. When they are rude, I attribute it to their hatred of Poles. When they are polite, I treat it as a symptom of their patronising attitude .... [M] y relationship with others can no longer be normal .... I am upset, distressed, angry and deeply offended. Wojciech Sadurski, Offending with Impunity: Racial Vilification and Freedom of Speech, 14 SYDNEY L. REV. 163, 186 (1992) . We should note in particular that the speech in this case apparently had more substantive, cognitive locutionary content than many instances of hate speech, and that Professor Sadurski is not, all things considered, a devotee of hate speech legislation. See id. at 193 ("Racists are there, and it is better to let them air their views in the open rather than allow an illusion to grow that the problem has been solved because racist statements have been made illegal.").
4. See, e.g ., the gradations among academic responses to the relation between workplace harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-2 (1994) , and the Free Speech Clause surveyed in Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REV. 687, 692-93 (1997) . Of course, there could arise a detailed and definitive future U.S. Supreme Court opinion on possible free speech limits on Title VII, but it seems fair to say that further Supreme Court opinions on hate speech would not guarantee political, intellectual, or even legal closure on crucial hate speech issues.
5. While particularized citations will be forthcoming below, Gadamer's magnum opus is HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., Continuum Publ'g 1994 ) (1960 [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]. A number of Habermas's works take up these broad themes. Among them, and one of the most recent, is JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996 ) (1992 . [Vol. 76:991 between the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of speech 6 in ways that track some standard discussions of the effects of hate speech. 7 Hate speech practically begs for reference to or comparison with Habermas's theory of communicative action, 8 and in particular for contrast with his ideal speech situation. 9 Gadamer, on the other hand, is especially attuned to relating language, and the meaning and effects of language, to history and traditions, 10 presumably not excluding traditions of verbal and other forms of racism. Gadamer is hardly inclined to argue that we should merely understand, and not apply, his theoretical work in our own contexts. For Gadamer, after all, understanding and application are inseparable; understanding is always already application."
Our general method, which bears certain affinities to the activity History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 931 (1996) (citing CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 17 (1966) ).
understanding and application of his texts. 3 Our conclusions can stand or fall on their own, without the implied endorsement of Gadamer and Habermas.
We are, again, looking merely for inspiration, for a clearer image, or for a better turn of phrase, not for a logical premise implying a theoretical solution to the hate speech problem.
The other sort of mistake is the opposite of the first. We must avoid simply dressing up our own pre-selected insights into the hate speech problem in the distinguished regalia of Gadamer and Habermas, without gaining at least a broader, clearer, or deeper understanding. In such a case, all that is genuinely interesting and distinctive about Gadamer and Habermas plays no real functional role. Such alleged insights may, in the extreme, not in fact be particularly insightful, and neither influenced by nor worthy of association with the names of Gadamer and Habermas. The essayist Montaigne, we may point out, was complaining of a related practice when he objected to the learned who "quote Plato and Saint Thomas in matters where the first comer would make as good a witness. ' '14 We should instead seek to learn what Gadamer and Habermas in particular, and not necessarily any observer of the passing scene, can teach us.
I. SELECTIONS FROM THE AMERICAN HATE SPEECH CASE LAW: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
For the sake of analytical clarity and simplicity, let us focus our attention on the admittedly distinctive case of the use of racial epithets and related racial slurs and invective. The use of racial epithets and their status in relation to the First Amendment have been judicially addressed in a number of legal contexts. Epithet speech has, for example, come into legal conflict with equal protection claims, 15 REV. 133, 145 (1982) (alterations made to conform quote to original)). However, the court proceeded to note that " [a] cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress also requires that 'the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff must be so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." ' Taylor, 706 A.2d at 696 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988) ); see also Wigginton v. Servidio, 734 A.2d 798, 807 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999) .
While "a single racial slur uttered by a 'stranger on the street' could not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct [for the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort] ... courts have recognized that employees are entitled to greater protection from insults than strangers and that employers have a higher duty than strangers to avoid inflicting emotional distress.... The employer's position of authority and power over the plaintiff and the abuse of the employer-employee relationship can both contribute to a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. (citation omitted). For further discussion, see, for example, Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219 n.4 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) ("Nor can we accept defendants' contention that plaintiff, as a truckdriver must have become accustomed to such abusive language."); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (discussing the legal sufficiency of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claim for employer's failure to control employees' derogatory ethnic remarks toward fellow employee).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) . The Supreme Court has, for example, recently reiterated that the "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive [sic] feelings in an employee would not sufficiently alter terms and conditions of employment to violate Title VII." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). But see the description of Professor Sadurski's non-workplace experience, supra note 3. See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (apparently distinguishing crucially, for Title VII purposes, between workplace discriminatory conduct that is "humiliating" as opposed to a "mere offensive utterance"). The Court in Harris concluded that the "mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee ... does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotations omitted). This sort of flat, broad determination begs for reconsideration, despite its legal support in cases such as Taylor, Of course, the real import, if not the denotative meaning, of a racial epithet may vary depending upon factors such as the racial identities of the speaker and audience, the personal and relative power relationships among the parties, the social context and tone of the conversation, the speaker's intentions, and any listener expectations. 21 Any real understanding of epithet speech must take such considerations into proper account.
The subtleties and complications of such speech should not, however, mislead us into thinking that racial epithet speech is essentially like most other forms of speech. As one court has observed with regard to a particularly virulent racial epithet, "[t]he use of the word ... automatically separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is discrimination per se. '22 The typical speaker of a racial epithet cannot entirely denature that epithet through tone of voice, facial expression, mood setting, or even express disclaimers. No speaker can thereby so easily set aside major themes of American legal and cultural history.
It has thus been argued that " [t] here are certain words and phrases 'that in the context of history carry a clear message of... hatred, persecution, and degradation of certain groups.' ' 23 Racial 706 A.2d at 690, and Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding two racial slurs to be insufficiently severe in the absence of "a barrage of opprobrious comments") (internal quotations omitted). The Taylor court recognized, however, that "[t]he connotation of the epithet itself can materially contribute to the remark's severity. Racial epithets are regarded as especially egregious and capable of engendering a severe impact." 706 A.2d at 690. These tensions and inconsistencies suggest that the courts do not have a clear understanding of how to legally handle severe epithet cases, partly because they do not consistently understand how language works within an ongoing historical culture. In Title VII cases, the judicial attitude ranges broadly in assessing the relevance and weight of recourse to epithets. For some, "mere" offensive utterances are distinguished from more serious forms of discrimination or harassment. See, e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 114 n.l (3d Cir. 1999 ) (considering mere offensive utterance as one of a dozen possible factors in hostile work environment claims). More realistically, it has also been recognized, in contrast, that "[plerhaps no single act can more quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment' ... than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet ... by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates." Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ). There is an arguable difference between at least some cases of casual, joking, egalitarian, nonauthoritative, comradely use of an epithet solely among members of the ethnic group, and even a single epithet used in earnest by a supervisor toward a work subordinate. See, e.g., Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1180 , 1187 Rodgers, 12 F.3d epithet speech therein differs from some other forms of hostile speech: "'[r]acial insults are different qualitatively because they conjure up the entire history of racial discrimination in this country.' ' 24 We shall briefly discuss below zs the relationship between this inevitable verbal "conjuring up" of an entire historical tradition and the logic of freedom of speech.
The cases have given us this and much else to think about. It seems plain enough that threats of violence based on racial identity can impair, rather than promote, genuine free speech in the sense of an uninhibited exchange of ideas. 26 Can we then go on to say that racial epithets undermine, or fail to contribute to, the robust exchange of social ideas, even where no explicit threat of violence is issued? Should such epithets be classified as contributions, or even attempts to contribute, to any ongoing public discussion? What is their value for free speech purposes, against which we might weigh any harassing or discriminatory tendencies such speech might carry? Do racial epithets constitute speech on a matter of public interest or concern, against which we might balance any countervailing public interests? Are there senses in which racial and other epithets send, expressly or impliedly, a constitutionally relevant message? Do racial epithets always or ever carry social messages independent of their propensity to wound? In what ways, if any, is it legitimate for courts or legislatures to judge the constitutional free speech value of the language of such epithets? Are there any appropriate grounds for legally restricting epithet speech that do not simply reflect disagreement with the speech's content or point of view?
II. SOME RESPONSES FROM THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE Hate speech obviously implicates, in one way or another, values such as freedom, equality, and dignity. 2 7 The academic commentators on hate speech often differ as to possible conflicts among these 24. Taylor, 706 A.2d It is thus a mistake to include typical epithet speech within the classic free speech paradigm of an exchange of popular, or unpopular, social ideas 38 aimed at informing or persuading, immediately or over time, at least some portion of one's audience. Epithet speech may well have other functions not only different from, but entirely incompatible with, the familiar exchange of social ideas paradigm. We must thus be alert to what epithet speech actually does, and to its actual role within lived human experience. 3 9 Epithet speech has understandably been said to partake more of action than of expression. 40 Professor Kent Greenawalt thus refers to at least some epithet speech as, to a degree, "situation-altering," 41 as opposed to purely expressive. 42 The intention behind such speech may thus be to wound, 4 3 humiliate," or otherwise inflict pain rather than to communicate a social idea in any classically discursive sense. There is probably a sense, though, in which all instances of (understood or even misunderstood) speech are "situation-altering," or are at least situation "altering" in the broad sense of tending either to somehow alter or else preserve a situation. Any ordinary conversation tends at a minimum to reinforce our previous assessment of our interlocutor's worthiness or competencies.
42 This distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects may not be strict, or even terribly viable. 4 9 If hate speech evokes or conjures up a racist tradition, 5 0 should we say, for example, that such a result is an illocutionary, or else a perlocutionary, effect of the speech? Either answer is defensible. Even if the distinction is thus not clear, however, the very idea that speech may have effects that do not depend upon, or are not limited to, the agreement or disagreement of any listener with the propositional content of the speech may help us to better understand the nature of hate speech."
It is certainly not difficult to think of examples of racist speech with clear and undeniable illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. The drive-by hurling of a racial epithet at a lone pedestrian may, as we have seen, evoke or conjure up an historical tradition, 52 at least some of which will take the form of illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. We should not, however, discount the illocutionary or perlocutionary effects of even refined, technical, and abstract discussions of race.
In our culture, for example, even the theoretical discussion of race and alleged native general intelligence 53 inevitably involves important illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. Some of these effects may be unintended, or even unrecognized. They may vary in 47. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power REV. 417, 431 n.49 (1987) . While the focus is normally on those perlocutionary effects that depend upon an understood message, or on the content of the speech, speech can have perlocutionary effects apart from any understood content, as in the case of someone who is frightened or alerted by the mere sound of a voice.
49. Cf. Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 199, 199 (1996) (referring to the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects as "tricky, and not always stable").
50. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 51. For relevant discussion, see, for example, Alexander, supra note 1, at 87-89 (discussing Altman, supra note 7); Altman, supra note 7, at 309-10; Butler, supra note 49, at 199, 202.
52. ban on 'epithets' will shade naturally into a ban on the ideas of subhuman, contemptible status that epithets express."); Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited, supra note 28, at 1082-84 ("Once the postmodern censors sweep away strict restrictions on the regulation of antisocial expression, they will have little protection when political activists with whom they sympathize have their own speech declared antisocial."); Sadurski, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the possibility of hate speech legislation's being used to silence the disadvantaged).
58. See, e.g., supra note 57; see also Alexander, supra note 1, at 93 ("[I]f a list of specific words is banned, undoubtedly new words will begin functioning as epithets.").
59. See Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1321 (1997) (questioning "whether the interventions of admittedly non-ideal governments can systematically be expected to be more harmful to the truth-finding process than the distortions occasioned by the operation of equally non-ideal inequalities and other misuses of communicative power in the deliberative setting").
60. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 79 (" [B] anning hate speech often leaves the hateful attitudes and beliefs intact and just creates the illusion that they have disappeared."); Dorsett, supra note 28, at 292 ("Critical race theorists, while emphasizing the harms of racist discrimination among different forms of racist speech or different classes of racist speakers. 6 Those more sympathetic to restrictions on hate speech, correspondingly, reject or minimize the likelihood or the moral weight of such concerns, perhaps in light of differing value priorities. 62 Below, we shall draw upon the work of Gadamer and Habermas to clarify and reinforce certain themes and to minimize or bypass others, with an eye toward theoretical progress on the hate speech problem.
III. GADAMER AND THE NATURE AND STATUS OF HATE SPEECH
Let us admit that there is something odd about turning to HansGeorg Gadamer for understanding of hate speech. It is vaguely like turning to Gandhi for insight into hate itself. We might well say that if there is any sort of discourse that is the diametric opposite of hate speech, it is embodied in Gadamer's work, as in, to choose merely one example, his approach to the basic Aristotelian texts. 63 At the very least, though, perhaps we can learn or more vividly appreciate something about hate speech through this especially stark contrast. Beyond Gadamer's sheer exemplariness, though, we can more fully appreciate the real nature and status of hate speech through some of Gadamer's central concerns, including for tradition and the so-called "history of effect," and for one's approach to one's own prejudices in genuinely fruitful interchange and understanding. 64 Gadamer can, for example, offer some perspective on the unusual nature of the most virulent racial epithets. It has been rightly observed that often, such epithets do not themselves literally convey any intended general social idea, 6 5 and are certainly no essential part speech, ignore the potential harm of inflamed repressed racism."); Sadurski, supra note 3, at 193.
61. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 78 ("Banning epithets, but not skillful rhetorical skewerings, would essentially and unjustifiably discriminate against low-brow forms of expression."); see also id. at 92. We would of course want to investigate whether the various psychological and other effects of crude and refined or subtle racist speech might significantly differ.
62 Gadamer explores with unusual acuity how "history affects and indeed effects consciousness. '69 The hurling of a racial epithet is not an isolated event. 7 0 It is in a sense a discrete verbal act, 71 but it is as much an act in history as the recounted story of a lynching, or the actual lynching itself, or all lynchings collectively. Gadamer clarifies for us how "every event is effected by history, '72 how it inescapably has its own pre-history, 73 and how it "does not appear ex nihilo. ' 74 Typically, the target of a racial epithet does not react psychologically to such an epithet as though its use were historically contextless. The epithet itself has a history, which helps explain why racists cannot just immediately mint new, but equally effective racial epithets, just to keep one step ahead of legal restrictions on traditional epithet speech.
Inexorably, both the epithet speaker and target are situated within historical traditions. 7 6 On Gadamer's understanding, our traditions are multiple 77 Gadamer's work is equally useful in clarifying how radically hate speech differs from any sort of attempt at genuine communication and understanding. These radical differences help show why legally restricting racial invective differs crucially from censoring the communication of distasteful opinions or from attempts to persuade an audience to adopt unpopular beliefs. Through Gadamer's work, we can better appreciate why hate speech regulation need not significantly impinge upon the communicative processes at the heart of the First Amendment.
Gadamer 
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977).
82. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 296 (" [T] he text belongs to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand itself.").
83. See id. at 300 (referring to the "history of effect" as "the reality and efficacy of history within understanding itself").
84. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 17 (David E. Linge trans., 1976).
[Vol. 76:991 provoking an adverse, unwelcome emotional reaction, or of evoking grisly historical traditions. Gadamer, however, refers to "reaching" an audience in a rather different sense.
For Gadamer, any attempt at genuine understanding requires a state of mind essentially antithetical to that of the epithet hurler. 85 In a genuine conversation, both interlocutors want to understand, 86 and they seek a mutual, 87 and perhaps mutually transformative, 88 understanding. Genuine conversation is a process that requires a certain tentativeness and openness, 89 a mutual vulnerability, 9° and a sense of the value of diverse perspectives 9 1 in light of one's own fallibility and limitations. 88. See WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 209; Mootz, supra note 13, at 536; Sherman, supra note 13, at 394; see also HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 110 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1981) ("Discussion bears fruit when a common language is found. Then the participants part from one another as changed beings. The individual perspectives with which they entered upon the discussion have been transformed, and so they are transformed themselves."). Again, there is certainly a depraved sense in which a racial slur can promote a transformation, and perhaps even a transformation of both speaker and victim, or of their relationship. This sort of transformation is, of course, not the product of any cooperative endeavor, or of any genuinely open-minded search for unattained insights.
89. See, e.g., PAUL CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH 72 (1988) (characterizing Gadamerian openness as a "listening stance"); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PRAISE OF THEORY: SPEECHES AND ESSAYS 72 (Chris Dawson trans., Yale Univ. Press 1998) (1983) (discussing Gadamer on the ability to recognize truth as itself requiring "an open mind"-as is presumably uncharacteristic of the typical epithet hurler); Sherman, supra note 13, at 392-93 (requiring openness to text and to other interlocutors); Georgia Warnke, Reply to Greenawalt, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 437,439 (1997) .
90. See GADAMER, supra note 88, at 100; cf. BERNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 144 ("It is through the fusion of horizons that we risk and test our prejudices."); GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 269 ("A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something."); PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 76 (John B. Thompson ed., 1981) (For Gadamer, "only insofar as I place myself in the other's point of view do I confront myself with my present horizon, with my prejudices."); Sherman, supra note 13, at 392-93.
91. See, e.g., GADAMER, IDEA OF THE GOOD, supra note 63, at xxxi ("[AII the while aiming to shed light on it from a variety of perspectives, but fully acknowledging that the insights gained in this way will of necessity be inconclusive and unsystematic."); Michael J. Of course, it is open to the epithet hurler to announce that he does not care to thus put into play, or to put at risk, any of his most virulent prejudices. He does not seek to inquire or to attain any degree of genuine openness or mutual vulnerability. He is indifferent to the hermeneutic task, or to what Gadamer refers to as "genuine speaking." 93 He does not at all seek to understand, to persuade, or to reach agreement. His purpose is more visceral. He seeks to use words as a kind of club, or better, as a whip that leaves permanent scars.
By way of response, we could, presumably, admit that the epithet hurler and the Gadamerian hermeneuticist have very little overlap of horizons, and that they are simply playing different language games. What sense would it make, by way of analogy, to judge the gladiator by the standards pertaining to the magician, or vice versa? Ultimately, though, there is little justification for our constitutionally deferring to the epithet hurler's inversion of and contempt for Gadamerian values.
We need not protect the epithet hurler because the basic purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause, whatever they are, need not be construed as neutral as between him and the Gadamerian inquirer. By way of loose analogy, we need not construct a theory of maturity such that everyone who wants to be thought of as mature turns out, on our theory, to be equally mature. This conclusion does not concern anyone's ideological bias or bias against any attempt at the articulate expression and coherent defense of disfavored ideas. We certainly need not claim that Gadamer's account of hermeneutics sets the minimum baseline for free speech protections. Such a 803, 807 (1990) ; Sherman, supra note 13, at 393 (arguing that a conversational partner must grant the possible superiority of the other partner's position).
92. See GADAMER, IDEA OF THE GOOD, supra note 63, at xxxi ("We cannot ascertain an indubitably secured starting point; we cannot know ahead of time where a philosophical discussion will lead us, and we will never be able to say that we have arrived at a definitive conclusion."); cf. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 166-67 (envisioning an inquiring interlocutor as one who proposes an initial possibility, with an appreciation of the role of the unexpected, and an openness to revision of some of one's initial prejudices). We should also note Gadamer's concern to detect and remedy the social and other conditions that tend to block or frustrate such egalitarian conversational inquiry. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 163. For Habermas's general agreement on this point, see infra note 123.
93. See GADAMER, supra note 84, at 17. This does not imply that only Gadamer can lead us to see these contrasts. Habermas in particular essentially follows Gadamer in this regard. See HOY & MCCARTHY, supra note 77, at 188 ("Habermas acknowledges Gadamer's Truth and Method as the source for Habermas's thesis that the telos of human language is reaching understanding and agreement.").
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If there are, nevertheless, some basic purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause-reasons why we typically wish to protect much popular or unpopular verbal expression-there is no reason to assume that any such reasons justify protection of hate speech. Those purposes do not cohere as well with the nature and effects of epithet spewing as with ordinary political discourse, however emotional or intemperate, let alone as well as with the practice of an ideal hermeneutic inquirer. Epithet speech may, on the most neutral understanding, simply not cohere with the acknowledged purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause.
We value free speech for its contributions, for example, to the flourishing of rich personal and intellectual development, 94 to the serious, dialogic exchange of ideas, of whatever stripe, bearing upon the conduct of a representative democratic government, 95 to the earnest, ongoing pursuit of truth under conditions of inevitable human fallibility, 9 6 to teaching tolerance, 9 7 or for other basic purposes. Yet we may find little or no reason to bring the typical instance of epithet hurling within the scope of Free Speech Clause coverage in the first place. Gadamer's account of conversation, and even of idealized hermeneutic inquiry, help us more fully appreciate this concept.
In particular, unlike today's pessimists, we need not assume that our racist and other unworthy traditions are frozen permanently and unalterably into our culture. 99. Merely for simplicity of exposition, we will refer mainly to Habermas, but much of the argument below could be developed through focusing on other writers, including Robert Alexy and Karl-Otto Apel. See, e.g., Robert Alexy, A Theory of Practical Discourse, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 151, 166 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr eds., 1990 ) ("Whoever justifies something at least pretends, at least with regard to the justification, to accept the other person as equal partner in justification and neither to exercise constraint nor to support constraint exercised by others."); Karl-Otto Apel, Is the Ethics of the Ideal Communication Community a Utopia? On the Relationship Between Ethics, Utopia, and the Critique of Utopia, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY, supra, at 23, 43 (asserting a "pragmatic self-contradiction" to afflict an assertion such as "I hereby assert as true that I am not obliged in principle to recognize all possible members of the unlimited community of argumentation as having equal rights"); id. at 55 ("[R]esponsible politics stands.., under the regulative principle of a long-term strategy of the realization of the formal preconditions for an ideal community of communication at all levels of human interaction."); id. at 48 (referring to "the normative preconditions of ideal communication, whose empirical realization in a concrete society must indeed also be subject to additional preconditions of historical.., concrete institutions and conventions"); See, e.g., id . at 285-86 (distinguishing "strategic" from "communicative" action). We should note that typical epithet speech is really neither "communicative" nor "strategic." It is not communicative insofar as it fails to aim at reaching an unimposed understanding in Habermas's sense, nor is it strategic insofar as epithet speech fails to follow rules of rational choice aimed at "influencing the decisions of a rational opponent. REV. 427, 435 (1997) (noting that to deny the "I" is "to itself reassert the existence of the 'I").
109. Some years ago, for example, Habermas indicated that the apparent consensus-seeking language game participant impliedly underwrites "the comprehensibility of the utterance, the truth of its propositional component, the correctness and appropriateness of its performatory component, and the authenticity of the speaking subject." HABERMAS, supra note 98, at 18; see also FRED R. DALLMAYR, CRITICAL ENCOUNTERS 80 (1987) . More recently, Habermas has held as among the presuppositions of argumentation that "[e]very subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse" and that " [e] himself or herself in some sort of performative contradiction."' But whether the epithet hurler actually engages in a performative contradiction is really not crucial for our purposes.
Instead, we might simply ask whether the epithet hurler intends the sort of speech activity that is logically included under the Free Speech Clause, given the latter's assumed purposes, again quite apart from any disagreement with the content of the speaker's message. At this point, we can call upon Habermas's discussion of ideal or undistorted communication for illuminating contrast. The point is, of course, not that free speech is worth protecting only in unrealized, ideal circumstances. Certainly, we want to protect the speech of more than just our most enlightened or mature citizens. Rather, Habermas's description of an unrealized communicative ideal may again allow us to think more clearly and impartially about what sorts of speech fall within the proper scope of the Free Speech Clause.
112
Habermas refers to "an ideal communication community encompassing all subjects capable of speech and action.", 3 Importantly for our purposes, "[e]very justified truth claim ... must ultimately be able to command the rationally motivated agreement of the community of interpreters as a whole. Here an appeal to some particular community of interpreters will not suffice." ' 1 defeat the functional logic of free speech to protect or not protect forms of speech based on how plausible or logically convincing anyone finds that speech.
115
The point instead goes to the ambitions or intent underlying typical epithet speech. Any neutral and reasonable observer would conclude that such epithets ordinarily are not even loosely, indirectly intended to ever inspire broad, let alone universal, public conviction. It is not as though epithet hurling is intended even as a mere contribution to public debate, with the realistic appreciation that the targets of the invective are unlikely to ratify their own denigration. Epithet hurling is typically not intended to persuade some uncommitted middle ground of public opinion or even to reinforce the views of confirmed racists in the audience. It is typically not intended to persuade anyone, including the speaker, of anything, to prepare the way for such persuasion, or to legitimize and reinforce any set of social beliefs. 116 Epithets do not, in any sense, invite discourse.' 17 This claim certainly does not deny that even the bare epithet has a certain locutionary or other sort of content, if only in the form of an implied evocation of some sort of racial invidiousness, with all its possible cultural resonances." 8 But the point of the speech, we may assume, is something like to degrade, to inflict pain and anxiety, and to indirectly exalt the speaker's group by comparison. The intent is thus akin to punching or kicking for group-based reasons. 1 ' 9 Doubtless a literal punch or kick can effectively communicate a clear, specific message.
Sometimes, a punch carries an unmistakable message. But we rightly do not think of, say, a race-based beating as speech or expression for preliminary free speech purposes, whether we regulate such "expression" in some fashion or not. 120 Habermas can offer a deeper and more detailed foundation for our thinking in such fashion.
There is, certainly, nothing question-begging or unfair about noticing that not all forms of literal speech have identical aspirations oriented to reaching understanding, there already exist.., the basic notions of equal treatment and general welfare on which all morality turns. ' 121 Similarly, there is no reason to believe that whatever reasons we may have for protecting freedom of speech must themselves be, in all respects, politically neutral. Nor would this sort of neutrality be desirable.
Moral thinking, in turn, requires that "[e]ach of us must be able to place himself in the situation of all those who would be affected by the performance of a problematic action or the adoption of a questionable norm. ' 1 22 Some epithet speakers may reply that in some proper, if rather starkly limited sense, they favor equal treatment on the basis of race. Their epithets may still be appropriately legally judged. And if some epithet speakers do not propose to respect any form of equal treatment, it is hardly unfair to notice this fact, as long as we draw only the proper inferences from such an admission.
23
Again, this approach does not promote the notion that a speaker who rejects some conception of equality, or of how moral principles must be universalized, should be prohibited from speaking. Certainly some such speakers will in fact still be promoting our reasons for protecting free speech, as in the case of current thoughtful debates over the moral status or equality of various forms of animal life. 1 2 4 But equally certainly, not all verbal racial abuse can reasonably be
